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Abstract
This paper argues how it is that woman’s role and function
within a global economy works in tandem with her own
discursive inscription. By drawing on the work of Gayatri
Spivak, it suggests a way in which Jacques Derrida’s
discursive treatment of the figure of woman intersects
with her material manifestation, her expected roles and
functions. It finds that the figure of woman in Derrida’s
work can be productively thought in conjunction with
living woman’s concrete objectification under capitalism.
Most generally, the paper hopes to open one line of
discussion into the way that certain oppressive institutions
are constructed and sustained.
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Over the years, a rich and fruitful critical literature
has grown around Jacques Derrida’s engagement
with the figure of woman. These critiques for the
most part used Derrida’s writings to examine the
ontological situation of woman. Judith Butler, for
instance, sparked a great body of work developing
the thesis that gender or sexual difference is not a
secondary aspect of, but fundamental to, being.
1
This paper distinguishes itself from this work by
not addressing the ontological status of woman.
Rather,itexaminesthefigureofwomanastheepis-
temological support for certain social and economic
institutions.
Just as Derrida positions his figure of woman
as a necessary piece of a grander philosophical
discussion, enabling his treatment of society,
politics, law, and love, I suggest that we read the
socio-political inscription of woman in Derrida in
relation to the set of economic structures that it
continues to sustain. More generally, I hope to
open a line of discussion between woman’s dis-
cursive inscription and her material manifestation,
her expected roles and functions. I would like to
deliver a reading of Derrida’s woman that works
in conjunction with an engagement with woman’s
position in global capitalism.
I believe that Derrida’s work can help reveal why
living woman’s expected and, in manycases, actual
role in production is both crucial to and occluded
by the system that it serves. I will look at Gayatri
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production to suggest a link to Derrida’s reading of
the figure of woman. To this end, I begin with an
accessiblereadingofDerrida’streatmentofwoman
as embodying an ‘‘excess’’ over a male norm. For
Derrida, woman represents excess, both as inert
redundancy, as well as a ‘‘too-much’’ that must
be guarded against. In this latter capacity, woman
comes to embody the possibility of man’s own
failures, his own feminization. Epistemologically,
she is robbed of herself: woman is robbed of
womanhood, which is developed instead according
to aspecific tropologicalgenealogy towhich woman
is bound to adhere.
If the figure of woman is the storehouse of
emotion that man denies himself in the interests of
his society, this paper will delineate a model by
which living woman then becomes the storehouse
of production, picking up the tasks that must be
done over and above legitimate or official labour.
With reference to Spivak’s work, I will argue how
it is that woman’s role and function within a global
economy works in tandem with her own discursive
inscription. I want to suggest a manner in which
Derrida’s discursive inscription for woman inter-
sects with her material manifestation.
My purpose here is not to give an exhaustive
reading of Derrida’s treatment of woman, nor to
reveal definitively the link between discursive
inscription and material manifestation. More than
anything,IwanttosuggestawayinwhichDerrida’s
account of woman can expose aspects of living
woman’spositioningwithinthespacessheinhabits,
andawayinwhich Derrida’sdiscursivepositioning
for woman can be productively thought in con-
junction with living woman’s specific material
objectification under capitalism. The ultimate
hope remains that these kinds of explorations will
help us understand the way that certain oppressive
institutions are constructed and sustained.
WOMAN AS EXCESS (DERRIDA)
To begin, I want to suggest what I consider to be
the central characterisation of woman explored by
Derrida: woman as excess. Woman, for Derrida,
is inscribed as ‘‘extra’’ to a male norm. She exists
and has her place as an inevitable fixture of life,
yet without the sovereignty to wilfully produce her
effect on the world. Lacking intention, woman
affects the world despite herself. She has an effect
on her surroundings, and she has an effect on
man; in each case, Derrida claims that woman’s
productions exist as that which must be ignored.
I want to draw attention to this prominent and
often explicit*yet little discussed*current in
Derrida’s reading which positions woman as ex-
cess, a persistent uncritical affirmative pressure,
a metaphorical protrusion interrupting the smooth
runningofthings.Mostgenerally,‘‘woman’’isread
by Derrida as an excessive interruption to any
attempt to understand the world as an elegant
structure.
It is of course clear that his characterisations
of woman are not supposed to describe innate,
organic or inescapable conditions of her being, or
to delimit biologically female tendencies. There is
an almost presupposed and accepted approach
when reading cultural characterisations of woman,
articulated and extended to Derrida by Drucilla
Cornell: that
it is not pre-given libidinal ‘‘drive’’ or anat-
omy that causes masculine privilege and the
corresponding subjection and silencing in
woman. Instead, patriarchy perpetuates it-
self through the linguistic structures and
cultural conventions that prop up patriarchy
and have been repeated until they are melted
into the unconscious and, indeed, even are
the unconscious.
2
For the most part,
3 Derrida’s critics accept that
his readings of ‘‘woman’’*which often describe
this figure’s great shortcomings*are dispassionate
readings of her positioning, that they characterise
rather than propagate her frequently patriarchal
placement. For Ellen Feder, Mary Rawlinson
and Emily Zakin, for instance, Derrida’s treatment
of woman undermines ‘‘phallogocentrism’’: his
model of ‘‘truth which is gendered feminine, while
its possessors are gendered masculine [...] exposes
the girders which bolster an apparently self-
supporting system.’’
4 In fact, the use of Derrida’s
woman as a device to expose the specifics of living
woman’s subjugation has been a common theme
among many critics, characterising her presence
for instanceas‘‘ametaphorfor indeterminacy,’’
5or
‘‘a structural [...] heterogeneity,’’
6 delimiting the
epistemological lynch-pins of patriarchy. If we
follow Derrida’s reading of woman’s discursive
inscription carefully, we will find, beyond her
discursive subjugation, the coordinates of her spe-
cific material subjugation as well.
A. R. Ward
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(page number not for citation purpose)In general, the figure of woman represents the
excesses of ‘‘amorous passion,’’ described by
Derrida as feminine ‘‘perversion,’’ which, like
‘‘jealousy,’’ comprises ‘‘a stratagem of femininity,
an arresting of nature by woman.’’ Derrida claims
that ‘‘in modern society [...] order has been
reversed by woman and that is the very form of
usurpation.’’ Significantly, Derrida claims that
these representations of women run right to the
heart of discourse. He writes abstractly that
‘‘woman’’ affects the smooth functioning of dis-
course at a structural level. Her presence in
language, as a figure and trope, inherently denies
certain possibilities for the discursive spaces, the
texts, in which she is found.
7
Mostbroadly,Derridafindsitimpossibletounify
the world as text with ‘‘woman’’ at its discursive
centre.Derridawritesof‘‘anaccount[oftheworld]
without edge or boundary, [an] account [without
limit,] all of whose visible space is but some border
ofitself.’’Itissoinclusive,infact,thatthetextmust
be defined negatively, as a ‘‘neither ...nor,’’ such
that its characterisation ‘‘is essentially classifica-
tory.’’Asitturnsout,onlywomancaninterruptthis
neither ...nor by its embodiment of a ‘‘doubly af-
firmative (or ... or).’’ This jarring, excessive,
interruption intersects the text as an endlessly
accommodating voice accepting every option: ‘‘a
measureless, excessive, immense yes: both to life
and to death.’’
8 Man’s ‘‘silent, untiring wan-
der[ing]’’ is punctuated always by the stereotype
of woman’s ‘‘pretty, pitiable bustling.’’
9 As such,
she is expected to be the repository for the extra-
occurrence, the persistent, often bothersome
source of what is unplanned, unnecessary and
irrational.
We can read Derrida’s interpretation of this
presumption of woman’s excessive nature meta-
phorically as a ‘‘spur,’’ the protrusion of a plant’s
dried spur shoot, whose presence goes entirely
unnoticed, even as it stubbornly fixes itself to
one’s clothing. Of course, this is not to deny
woman’s severe effect on her environment. The
reason the spur goes unnoticed is that one expects
it to become affixed to one’s clothes. Conse-
quently, we do not register their size, shape or
number, for instance, as we pull them off our
clothing. They simply exist in the background of
life, as to-be-pulled-off, as a fact that must be
accommodated. So it is with this figure of woman
according to Derrida, her articulations and pro-
ductions are expected but presupposed to be
irrelevant, occluded by experience.
Like the spur on one’s clothing, however, this
figure’s effect must be dealt with in the course of
life; specifically, her excessive presence acts as
antidote to excess in general by prompting dis-
cursive strategies to mitigate her influence. Thus,
paradoxically, her discursive existence acts to
protect the stability of meaning, of place, of law.
Ultimately, her representations come to define
not her own identity so much as man’s potential
failings: she is a warning against going as far as
she, herself, goes. In this light, Derrida thinks of
her as the spur-like ‘‘projection of a ship,’’ which
protects against the hostility of the waves, keeping
the vessel*its content, its meaning, its truth*
intact and on course. For Derrida, woman pro-
tects truth and the representation of reality: she
‘‘protects the presence, the content, the thing
itself, meaning, truth.’’ Thus, woman is no more
than that which she protects against. She protects
us from the waves, but she is equally ‘‘the seething
surf, [...] howling, threatening, crying and
screaming at me.’’
10
However, the existence of ‘‘woman’’ only pro-
tects us by forcing an organised vigilance against
woman herself. The very divisions and classifica-
tions of our world are in a large part an attempt
to mitigate woman’s supposedly corruptive influ-
ence. Derrida explains that ‘‘political command’’ is
forged as an assertion against woman’s ‘‘domestic
government,’’ alongside the substitution of ‘‘moral
for physical love,’’ to ‘‘protec[t] man [...] from his
destruction through the fury of woman.’’ In fact,
society ‘‘imagines’’ morality itself precisely in or-
der to control ‘‘the number and intemperance of
women.’’ In the face of woman’s excesses, ‘‘the
morality of society [finds that it can] defer or
weaken [her excesses] by imposing [...] the virtue
of modesty.’’
11
Consequently, woman does not belong to her-
self. Unlike the idea of man, of an individual
subject, the idea of woman comprises a device, a
fact. She opens and embodies a universal cate-
gory that can include men as well. ‘‘Woman’’ is the
name of excessive acceptance over and against a
masculine norm of discernment: ‘‘there is no
natural or symbolic law, universal law, or law of a
genre/gender here [but] only’’ the implicit general-
isation of womanhood. While we learn that affir-
mation (or ... or), for instance, is only usually
Spivak’s Derrida
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(page number not for citation purpose)linked to women, we are told that ‘‘it is then more
than probable that, as long as I say yes, yes, I am a
woman.’’
12 As man is linked to the distinctly
feminine, femininity is itself freed from its biologi-
cal tether and, ceasing to depend on living woman,
becomes ‘‘ever-after.’’
13 Even a normative male
subject can assume aspects ‘‘of being a fe-male or
of changing sex.’’
14 Naturally, ‘‘woman’’ must exist
as living women as well, who appear to man as
the embodiment of an object of desire quite apart
from their role as feminine excess: ‘‘in the midst of
the breakers of his plots and plans, [man] sees
perhapscalm,enchantingbeingsglidepasthim,for
whose happiness and retirement he longs*they are
women.’’
15
Though they cause his frenzy, and fill his life
with anxiety, living women embody ‘‘a certain love
story.’’
16 But woman’s deeply conflictual effect on
the world does not depend on living women;
instead, this effect exists perpetually before her:
hers ‘‘is the name for what has been effaced or
subtracted beforehand.’’ Living women are repre-
sented by a discursive presence*woman*that
precludes them from a subjecthood enjoyed by
man. Like a vanishing mediator, a living woman
withdraws herself from the scene to leave only the
effects of her excesses, which exist always ‘‘at a
distance’’ from herself.
17 Put figuratively, we see a
woman dancing but we are deceived: ‘‘the dancer
is not a woman dancing’’ but dancing itself; ‘‘she is
not a woman but a metaphor.’’
18
Living women thus present the figure of woman,
eliciting a particular reaction. What ‘‘woman’’ is,
does, and represents, however, cannot be altered
by any living woman. ‘‘Woman’’ is one of man’s
possibilities. And yet man is able to approach
woman’s character, articulations and productions
as though they were extra to, or in excess of, his
own. A living woman remains the embodiment
of femininity, but does not control its truth.
Consequently, Derrida explains woman in terms
of‘‘grammatical,’’asopposedto‘‘anatomical,’’‘‘sex,’’
so that it can be applied, exchanged and adopted.
As Derrida unlocks the tropological genealogy for
‘‘woman,’’ finding within it the feminine aspects of
male identity, he goes as far as to suggest that living
woman’s ‘‘I’’ is actually spoken in a man’s voice, or
worse, ‘‘the ‘I’-less ‘I’ of the narrative voice, the
I ‘stripped’ of itself, the one that does not take
place, it is he who brings them to light.’’
19 Spivak,
too,declares,withreferencetoDerrida’swork,that
her ‘‘own definition of a woman is very simple: it
rests on the word ‘man’.’’
20
Spivak is most adept at finding in Derrida’s
texts, ‘‘a certain textuality of woman,’’ wherein
man often emerges as ‘‘simply the hero of philoso-
phy.’’
21 When in Margins of Philosophy for instance,
Derrida discovers a trace in language that acts as
both cause and effect, and suggests that ‘‘Being
speaks always and everywhere throughout lan-
guage,’’
22 Spivak emphasises what is at stake in
the opposition of cause and effect to uncover the
gendered implications of Derrida’s text. Derrida
describes an ‘‘archi-writing,’’ before the letter,
that suggests ‘‘a presence to itself of the subject
in a silent and intuitive consciousness.’’
23 By this
means, he posits a (simulacrum of) presence as a
cause and effect within a system of language.
24
Exercising what Michael Syrotinski calls a‘‘healthy
disrespect for the ‘authority’ of the proper body of
Derrida’s text,’’
25Spivak readsDerrida’sargument*
ostensibly for language as an effect that carries
within it the trace that simulates cause*as his
attempt to halt the conceptual shift from language-
as-effect to language-as-cause, where the latter
implies a particular predication of ‘‘man.’’ Spivak
asserts that ‘‘Derrida seemed to have felt that the
thinking of the trace would halt the unintended
[...] securing of the definitive predication of
‘man’.’’
26
I am giving this example to illustrate Spivak’s
highly effective method by which her sometimes
permissive readings actualise the ethico-political
possibilities of Derrida’s work: ‘‘Derrida, she is
ultimately saying, has simply not gone far en-
ough.’’
27 This essay seeks to explicate a particular
instance of a Spivakian reading practice.
It is because the definition of ‘‘woman’’ rests on
‘‘man’’ that the abstract woman’s productions and
articulations are taken for granted, as derivative.
They are simply in excess of what is creative or
original, as extra to male reality. Could it be that
this particular positioning for woman, discovered
by Derrida, does not simply have a philosophical
provenance, but works in specific conjunction
with a greater economic imperative? The follow-
ing section tracks this possibility to suggest that
this straightforward reading of Derrida’s woman
as excess must be thought in terms of its econom-
ic, rather than its philosophical, provenance. In
fact, woman’s positioning as excess is actually
A. R. Ward
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with global capital.
Looking closely at Spivak’s work, I will argue
that this positioning might be best explained by
the role that women play or are expected to play in
production. By making the link between Derrida’s
reading of woman and Gayatri Spivak’s treatment
of woman’s role in production, I hope to describe
and develop the link between woman’s discur-
sive inscription and her material role in global
capitalism, and better understand Spivak’s read-
ing practice as well.
A ROLE AND FUNCTION FOR FEMININE
EXCESS (SPIVAK)
As I have suggested, this part of my paper posits a
particular way in which woman’s discursive (we
could also call it cultural) inscription as read by
Derrida can be directly linked to her material
positioning. Derrida’s discursive inscription of
woman as excess is inextricably linked to the
productive function that living woman serves, or
is expected to serve. Her metaphorical inscription
must be thought of in relation to her material
accommodation within capitalism. In particular,
I will suggest how the inscription, woman as
excess, might be linked to the function of living
women as they provide an essential while unac-
knowledged support for a national economy to
which in many ways they do not seem to belong.
Due to the way woman is thought, her labour and
production can be located, as she herself is, in
excess of what is considered necessary. I hope to
show how the inscription of woman as excess
enables the possibility of living woman’s role as a
hidden support of production. I will limit myself
here to two situations that expose this link. I will
delineate how it is that Spivak’s Third World
woman conforms to Derrida’s reading of woman,
and how it is that woman’s traditional role in the
home is enabled by this inscription.
For thistask,mysubjectwillremainaconception
ofwoman‘‘ingeneral,’’referringtoarepresentation
ofwomanintermsofherrelationshiptomanacross
different situations and locations, while not, how-
ever, implying a commonality among its living
referents beyond a common relationship to global
capitalism. I know that by using the notion of
women in general I am proceeding in seeming
contradiction of Derrida’s own focussed reading of
woman in his Spurs where he takes a generation of
feministstotaskpreciselyforbeingtoocasualabout
defending a representation of ‘‘woman’’ lacking a
distinct identity for her.
28 And Spivak, too, has
over the years delivered an incisive and convincing
questioning of branches of western feminism that
fail to take geopolitical and economic differences
between women into account. As Stephen Morton
rightly points out, Spivak has, together with Chandra
Mohanty, Farrida Akhter and Trinh T. Minh-ha,
called western feminists such as Julia Kristeva
and Simone de Beauvoir to account for describing
womenfromwhatSpivakhascollectivelycalledthe
‘‘Third World’’ in the terms of western female
subject constructions.
29 As she puts it diplomati-
cally while reading Kristeva: ‘‘a deliberate applica-
tion of the doctrines of French High ‘Feminism’ to
a different situation of political specificity [...] may
mean nothing or, indirectly, further harm for
women in the Third World.’’
30
It is, however, also the goal of Spivak’s ‘‘theory
of strategic essentialism [to explore] the ways in
which [...] gendered subjectivity can be mobilized
as part of a political strategy.’’
31 While reminding
western feminists (including herself among them)
that ‘‘essentialism is a trap’’ when it comes to
privileging female experience*the experience of
women varies too greatly across the world*she
does suggest the need for a categorical essential-
ism or commonality, ‘‘an extender of the Platonic
mandate to women in general.’’
32 My use of the
term ‘‘woman’’ shifts focus from category to con-
cept, suggesting that a concept of woman can
influence the lives of women. Moreover, I use the
term ‘‘women in general’’ in conversation with
Spivak’s own ‘‘Third World woman,’’ which also
exists conceptually across the multiple countries
and cultures of the ‘‘global South’’ as the peoples
understood strategically as collectively occupying
a single productive capacity relative to the First
World. I believe that her strategic construction,
Third World woman, comprising ‘‘the coded dis-
cursive management of [this figure’s] new socia-
lisation,’’ can be extended to woman’s productive
capacity more generally.
33
Spivak argues that productive work is delimited
by the active disavowal of other kinds of work that
lack the legitimacy and transparency of an official
workplace. Whether domestic or industrial, this
kind of disavowed labour takes place chiefly
within the home. Domestic chores, and also the
Spivak’s Derrida
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performed outside the field of legitimate or official
labour and are considered the purview of women.
She finds this productive expectation of woman so
pervasive, in fact, that she delivers her reading of
‘‘the Third World woman’’ often as though this
term were synonymous with ‘‘the Third World’’ in
the context of their exploitation, implying that it
is woman who ultimately carries the burden of
exploitation within the Third World.
It would seem that, for Spivak, the Third World
woman’s relationship to her own national econ-
omy can be modelled as an extension of her
country’s relationship to a global economy. As
the First World has increased its consumption
during a period of ‘‘post-industrialism,’’ the Third
World has taken on more and more work for the
First World, such as the manufacturing of textiles,
and the Third World has consequently become
‘‘the new focus of super-exploitation.’’ Spivak
posits her ‘‘Third World woman’’ as ‘‘the worst
victi[m] of the recent [‘post-industrial’] exacerba-
tion of the international division of labour.’’ The
Third World woman is placed as the last link in a
chain of fulfilment (note that we are, as always,
proceeding from Spivak’s First World perspec-
tive). The Third World picks up the excess needs
of the First, and woman, in turn, picks up the
excess needs of her country. Crucially, these
productive relationships are occluded.
34
The First World forgets its reliance on the Third,
and in doing so, it forgets its reliance on the Third
World woman. Yet it is key to notice that this chain
offulfilmentcanonlyremainsosuccessfullyhidden
because the First World, itself, participates directly
inaforgettingofwoman.ThefunctionoftheThird
World as hidden excess, extending First World
capacity while obscuring First World productive
inefficiencies, correlates metaphorically with the
private (if productive) nature of the household.
Production taking place inside the home is in
general an unacknowledged excess, supporting
production that takes place outside it.
Derrida, and especially the later Derrida, would
have agreed that woman’s function within capital-
ismhas been hidden from daily view by aparticular
perspective running through the First World.
Though he rarely tackles gender difference directly
when writing about capitalism, ‘‘the question of
woman’’ is an almost constant background to this
work. When describing the social nature of Marx’s
spectrality in Specters of Marx, for instance, he
stresses the need to ‘‘make [the apparition] speak
with so many other tables in our patrimony,’’ and
laterDerridaconfirmsthat‘‘thequestionofwoman
and sexual difference is at the heart of this analysis
of spectral filiation.’’
35 Though it is not always
obvious, Derrida protests in his response to critics
that he is fully aware of ‘‘the paternalistic phallo-
gocentrism that marks all scenes of filiation [...]i n
Karl Marx.’’
36
What Spivak adds is that the dominant under-
standing of the capitalist value system in the
First World is based upon an ideology of national
self-sufficiency that specifically excludes woman.
Spivak quotes a professor of business at Harvard
to illustrate the simplicity with which capitalism
supposedly operates from a First World perspec-
tive: ‘‘money is simply electronic impulses. With
the speed of light it moves effortlessly between
distantcentres.’’Asmarketplacesexpand,thereisa
belief that ‘‘circulation time attains the apparent
instantaneity of thought (and more).’’
37
Spivak notes, however, that in order to maintain
thisapparentinstantaneity,theglobalcirculationof
value necessitates a constant ‘‘continuity of pro-
duction’’onanenormousscaletosafeguardagainst
otherwiseinevitablecapitalshortages.Theseeming
efficiency of capitalism is built upon the managed
occlusion of a massive inefficiency. Consequently,
Spivakfindsthatcertaingroupsmustbecontracted
to maintain a continuity of production. She notes
that the instantaneity of capitalism is sustained in
part by keeping ‘‘the labour reserves in the com-
prador countries outside [of this] instantaneity’’:
Whereas Lehman Brothers, thanks to com-
puters, ‘‘earned about $2 million for ... 15
minutes of work’’ [article in The New York
Times], the entire economic text would not
be what it is if it could not write itself as a
palimpsest upon another text where a woman
in Sri Lanka has to work 2,287 minutes to
buy a t-shirt.
Spivak uncovers an extra, hidden space which
absorbs excesses to maintain the appearance of
efficiency: global capitalism’s space of excess ‘‘is
continually being produced by the shifting lines of
the international division of labour,’’ that is, by
consistently ‘‘ignoring the dark presence of the Third
World.’’ In light of Spivak’s keen insight, we cannot
help butnotice that certain labour reserveswithinthe
First World, namely in the home, must also be
A. R. Ward
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World, exist as extra to the normal running of
capitalism. To explain the occlusion, Spivak posits
these hidden excessive spaces as indicative of an
‘‘unacknowledged, [internally focussed,] ‘nationalist’
view of ‘productivity’’’ that facilitates the offloading
of extra work without acknowledging it as part of
legitimate global production. Spivak claims that
this ‘‘nationalist view’’ can only ask the question
of value whilst actively forgetting ‘‘the actual price-
in-exploitation’’ of its own perspective.
38
Spivak’s ‘‘nationalist view’’ suggests that people
believe in the efficiency of their nation’s capitalist
economy, even when presented with evidence
contradicting their belief. Such evidence is simply
‘‘forgotten’’ in the moment of belief. Significantly,
the ‘‘nationalist view’’ provides more than a per-
spective on the mechanisms of a capitalist econ-
omy; it amounts also to an ideological attachment
to capitalist efficiency based on the active exclu-
sion of specific available knowledge.
39 Though
unfair trade practices with the Third World, in-
cluding the use of women and children in sweat-
shops, are now widely acknowledged, it has been
possible to ‘‘forget’’ the role of the Third World
woman in First World production. Similarly,
though the traditional expectation of a woman’s
place in the house in well recognized, widespread,
and even widely criticised in the First World, we
are no closer to quantifying the value of homework
to the capitalist economy. Woman can be encour-
aged into the official work place, but for those who
work in the house, this work is ‘‘forgotten.’’
Spivak’s reading of woman is situated among
an illustrious feminist literature produced in
conversation with Derrida’s work. Though certain
feminists, such as Elizabeth Meese and Sally
Robinson, criticise Derrida for rejecting femi-
nism, many others, such as Luce Irigaray and
Julia Kristeva, have made Derrida integral to their
writing.
40 Tina Chanter defends Derrida against
his feminist detractors: ‘‘if Derrida shows no
respect for those whose work shows no respect
for his, it is not because he is anti-feminist.’’
41
Woman in general has been framed, as per
Derrida’s reading, as an insatiable producer of
excesses, and that her productions are ignored
as irrelevant. The ‘‘gendered body’’ is directly
‘‘encrypted there in the indifference of super-
exploitation, of the financialization of the globe.’’
42
Woman is silenced by her gendered social inscrip-
tion and determination as reproductive agent. We
might recall, for instance, a number of Spivak’s
implicit notions or topics that frame woman
within capitalism by sidelining her productive,
in favour of her reproductive, capacity.
43 Spivak
touches upon a framework by which woman’s
objectification as a reproductive agent serves to
stage her productive relationship to the world. She
suggests, in fact, that the subjugation of woman on
the basis of gender cannot be separated from the
materialexploitationofwoman.Sheremarksthatit
isimpossible, giventhe rolethatgender playsinthe
globaldivisionoflabour,toopposetheexploitation
of her productive capacity as ‘‘systemic’’ and the
iniquitiesofhergenderas‘‘anti-systemic’’:whatwe
are witnessing is ‘‘the undoing of [any] systemic 
antisystemic binary opposition’’ within exploita-
tion.
44Noticealso,however,thattheoveremphasis
on her reproductive capacity not only enables her
material exploitation, but also the active structural
occlusion of her productive capacity.
AccordingtoSpivak,woman’srelationshiptothe
world is shaped, first, as a producer of children
without independent sexuality or subjectivity. Spi-
vak remarks that the clitoris is universally over-
looked as an irrelevant, one might say excessive,
signifier of a female orgasmic pleasure that ‘‘does
notentailanyonecomponent oftheheterogeneous
female reproductive scenario.’’ We might recall
Derrida’s reading of the law as the active curtailing
of woman’s corruptive influence. If woman’s in-
scribed tendency to emotional outbursts, to wear
her exaggerated feelings on her sleeve, has no place
in society, woman must be given a role that
mitigates her behaviour. This role is of a reproduc-
tive agent. Her nature, in other words, is made
to seem in excess of her proper role. Because ‘‘the
clitoris escapes reproductive framing,’’ it serves
‘‘asthesignifierofthesexedsubjectthatiseffaced.’’
We can see the brutal material effects of a mechan-
ism to efface woman’s subjectivity metaphorically,
for instance, in the practice of ‘‘cliterodectomy on
women.’’ And in the First World, Spivak remarks
that this effacement of woman as subject also
occurs metaphorically even if not so brutally: the
‘‘effacement of the clitoris’’ is not physical but
includes
the (sex) objectification of women by the
elaborate attention to their skin and fac ¸ade as
represented by the immense complexity of
Spivak’s Derrida
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(page number not for citation purpose)the cosmetics, underwear, clothes, advertise-
ment, women’s magazine, and pornography
networks.
E v e nt h e‘ ‘ d o u b l es t a n d a r di nt h ec r i t e r i ao f
men’s and women’s ageing’’ and, more specifically,
the ‘‘public versus private dimensions of menopause
as opposed to impotence,’’ promulgate a specific
forgetting of woman. Except as ‘‘‘imitators’ of men,’’
women are only ‘‘agent[s] of reproduction.’’
45
Woman is pushed into her role because, as
Derrida reasons, her right to emotion must be
negated in the interests of the smooth function-
ing of society. Being a mother is good for woman.
Thus Spivak remarks that woman becomes the
embodiment of a ‘‘displacement [or ‘transplant’]
of eroticism.’’ No matter what woman creates or
articulates, such productions will always be read in
the context of her rightful, proper role as mother.
46
Notice again a direct application of Derrida’s
reading:woman’sexcessivepresencestands hereas
antidote, giving rise to discursive strategies that
mitigateher influence. Tothisend,Spivakspecifies
woman’s objectification with the notion of ‘‘surro-
gacy,’’ which establishes woman’s representation
through an artificial construction of a ‘‘fulfilled
female subject of motherhood’’ that can only
be thought predictably, as a neatly ‘‘presupposed
subject.’’ Woman’s functional representation as
producer of children is linked to an association
with ‘‘homeworking,’’ both the production in the
home of textiles for export and domestic chores, as
‘‘empiricistindividualism,’’bywhichawomandoes
what she feels she is best suited to.
47 In both the
Third World and the First, woman’s place in the
home remains an enduring stereotype. In every
case, the tendency to escape the capitalist value
chain within the home functions chiefly as an
erasure of woman’s productive work by suggesting
that such behaviour comes naturally to her. Within
the First World, woman is associated with a
‘‘domesticeconomy,’’existingoutsidethecapitalist
accumulation of a ‘‘political economy.’’
48
Thus production performed by woman within
the home is not classified as such. This work is
extra to the official or legitimate circuits of produc-
tion and so only exists as excess. In fact, sewing,
stitching and weaving, like cooking, cleaning
andchild-minding,is‘‘historicallynamedwoman’s
work or assigned to domestic labour’’ precisely
because woman is expected to perform character-
istically excessive actions. Woman’s productive
life, like her emotional life, is perceived outside
the bounds of legitimacy. What she does is simply
done in the natural course of her existence and
thus beyond the calculus of an official economy.
In general, then, ‘‘woman’’ becomes a figure set
up to serve an economic imperative that is im-
mediately only apparent as a biological imperative.
The ‘‘arrangement of the world in terms of the
reproduction of future generations,’’ implicit in the
role of woman, and labelled by Spivak more gen-
erally as ‘‘the uterine social organisation,’’ works in
close conjunction with a perception of woman as
unacknowledged supplement, as excess.
49
CONCLUSION
We find woman’s material function within capital-
ism entwined with her discursive inscription as
excessattwolevels.Thatwoman’sactions,produc-
tions and articulations are in general perceived as
excessive allows for her effect or signature on the
world to be wilfully ignored. Also, that woman is
specifically perceived as emotionally excessive has
promulgated her circumscription to the role of
mother,andtoworkinandfor thehome,including
the production of textiles for capitalist markets.
In no way do I feel that these connections
between inscription and lived reality, or between
discourse and materiality, explain the lived ex-
perience of any woman. My purpose here has
been rather to juxtapose a discursive inscription
with its possible potential material manifestations,
and to show the benefits of a particular reading.
In a sense, this essay amounts to a reminder that
Derrida’s reading of woman, as well as his other
readings of discursive figures, can still be explored
with the aim of revealing the potential impetus
behind a particular configuration of the world. By
following Spivak in refracting Derrida’s reading
through the needs and expectations of global capi-
talism, and by determining a scope and context
for his construction of ‘‘woman,’’ I hope that such
an exploration can continue.
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